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Sovereignty and cooperation in regional Pacific tuna 
fisheries management: Politics, economics, conservation 
and the vessel day scheme 
Quentin Hanich,* Hannah Parris† and Martin Tsamenyi* 
Abstract 
The Pacific islands region has developed a collaborative approach to fisheries management that has set global 
precedents in regional fisheries co-operation and significantly boosted Islanders’ capacity to manage the 
region’s tuna fisheries in a manner consistent with their individual national interests. Through this cooperation, 
the Pacific islands states have developed a collective influence in fisheries negotiations that is arguably far 
greater and more effective than what they could achieve individually. During 2007-2009, the Pacific islands 
region further developed its collective approach by establishing new initiatives in regional fisheries co-
operation that are of global interest. Chief among these is the Vessel Day Scheme, which introduces a flexible 
and potentially tradeable permit scheme into regional management, and a supporting set of zonal based 
management measures. This paper examines the evolution and development of these recent management 
initiatives and provides a tentative evaluation of these against the conservation and management agreements 
entered into by the Pacific islands.  
______________________________________________ 
Introduction 
Regional co-operation is vitally important in the 
Pacific islands region due to the migratory nature of 
the region’s tuna stocks, and consequently the 
fisheries themselves, and the limited capacity of 
most Pacific island states1 to take advantage of their 
rights and discharge their obligations under the 
United Nations Law of the Sea Convention2 (LOSC) 
following the extension of maritime zones of 
jurisdiction. The Pacific island states have 
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† Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian 
National University. Ms Parris gratefully acknowledges the 
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1 The Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) is a 
subsidiary body of the Pacific Islands Leaders Forum. It 
promotes coordination and cooperation on fisheries issues, 
particularly with respect to the region wide tuna fisheries. 
Membership mirrors that of the Forum and includes 
Australia, New Zealand, Cook Islands, Federated States of 
Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, 
Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, 
Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. For the purposes of 
this paper, the term ‘Pacific island states’ refers to FFA 
members except Australia and New Zealand. 
2 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for 
signature 10 December 1982, 1833 UNTS 3 (entered into 
force 16 November 1994). 
developed a strong collective approach and recently 
established new initiatives in regional fisheries co-
operation that are of global interest. These regional 
achievements are particularly impressive given the 
limited goverance capacity of the region, and the 
fragile economic situation in many of the Pacific 
states. This paper examines the evolution and 
development of these recent management initiatives, 
with particular focus on the Vessel Day Scheme. 
The Pacific island states and territories and their 
tuna fisheries 
The Pacific islands region encompasses a unique 
grouping of small island states characterised by 
small land masses surrounded by large oceanic 
exclusive economic zones (EEZs). In total, these 
zones cover approximately 30 569 000 km² of the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO)3 and 
include some of its most productive fishing waters. 
3 For the purposes of this paper, the WCPO is defined as those 
waters within the Area defined by the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean. This 
stretches from Indonesia and the Philippines in the west to 
Hawaii, Kiribati and French Polynesia in the east. This region 
is defined in Convention for the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean, opened for signature 5 September 
2000 (entered into force 19 June 2004) art 1.  
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The WCPO tuna fisheries (skipjack, yellowfin, 
bigeye and albacore) were worth approximately 
A$5.4 billion in 2008.4 Roughly 57 per cent of all 
WCPO catches are taken from the Pacific island 
EEZs, the remainder from high seas and other 
coastal states. 
These fisheries are a key development opportunity 
for many of the region’s developing island states 
and provide significant financial contributions to 
governments. Many Pacific island States, 
particularly in the western part of the region, depend 
heavily upon these fisheries for revenue and 
economic activity.5 
The two key fleets in the Pacific islands tuna 
fisheries are distant water fishing vessels and 
domestic fishing vessels. Distant water fishing 
vessels provide the majority of the fleet and 
originate predominately from China, Japan, Korea, 
the United States, Taiwan and the European Union. 
They are either based within a Pacific island state 
(due to licensing requirements or operational 
factors) or operate from a distant home port. They 
catch the majority of the value in the fishery and 
operate through access agreements or are directly 
licensed by the coastal states to fish within their 
EEZ.  
Domestic fishing vessels are either nationally owned 
and operated, or foreign owned and operated 
through domestic charters and/or joint ventures with 
local interests. They are generally smaller vessels 
that mostly fish for tuna within their own flag state’s 
EEZ. The majority of such vessels are longliners, 
although in the past decade an increasing number of 
purse seiners have registered in Pacific island states 
                                                     
                                                     
4 Robert Gillett, ‘Pacific Islands Region’ in Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Review of 
World Marine Fishery Resources No 457 (2005) 144; Peter 
Williams and Peter Terawasi, ‘Overview of Tuna Fisheries in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean, including Economic 
Conditions – 2008 WCPFC-SC5-2009/GN WP-1’ (Paper 
presented at the Fifth Regular Session of the Scientific 
Committee of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission, Port Vila, Vanuatu 10-21 August 2009). For the 
purposes of this estimate, this includes the EEZs of: (FFA 
members) Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, 
Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, Tonga, Tuvalu, 
Vanuatu (and non-FFA members) American Samoa, French 
Polynesia, New Caledonia, Pitcairn Island, and the French 
territory of Wallis and Futuna. The data for this estimate was 
sourced from Gillett. 
5 Asian Development Bank, The Pacific’s Tuna: The 
Challenge of Investing in Growth (1997); Robert Gillett, 
Mike McCoy, Len Rodwell and Josie Tamate, Tuna: A Key 
Economic Resource in the Pacific Islands (2001).  
and are now considered to be domestically based 
vessels.6 
These fisheries are coming under increasing 
pressure from overfishing and overcapacity. 
Scientific and economic advice has clearly stated 
that overfishing and overcapacity now threaten the 
long term sustainability of some key fish stocks7 
with fishing effort significantly above optimal 
levels. This is reducing the profitability of the 
fishery and undermining opportunities for Pacific 
island states to develop fishing and related 
industries.8 
Regional institutions for fisheries cooperation 
and capacity building 
The Pacific islands states depend heavily upon 
regional cooperation and the effective operation of 
regional institutions to enable and support fisheries 
management and development. The success of this 
cooperation is critically important given the highly 
migratory nature of the region’s tuna fisheries and 
the region’s limited national capacity and its high 
dependence upon fisheries resources. Any serious 
threat to the sustainability of the tuna resource can 
be viewed as a threat to the region’s economic 
viability and food security.  
In 1979, the independent members of the Pacific 
Islands Forum (then named the South Pacific 
Forum) foresaw the challenges involved in 
managing and developing their newly proclaimed 
EEZs and recognised that individually they did not 
have the capacity to respond adequately to these 
challenges and maximise their opportunities. With 
remarkable vision, they combined their resources 
and established the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FFA) to promote intra-regional cooperation 
and harmonisation of fisheries management policies. 
The mission of the FFA is to support and enable 
Pacific island states to achieve sustainable fisheries 
6 Elizabeth Havice, ‘The State of Play of Access Agreements 
with Distant Water Fishing Partners: Implications and 
Options for Pacific Island Countries’, report to the Forum 
Fisheries Agency (2007).  
7 See, eg, Anonymous, ‘Report of the Scientific Committee, 
fourth regular session’ (paper summarising the Fourth 
Regular Session of the Scientific Committee, Port Moresby, 
Papua New Guinea. 8-19 August 2008), available at Western 
and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
<http://wcpfc.org.int> at 17 January 2009. 
8 Tom Kompas and Nhu Che, ‘Economic Profit and Optimal 
Effort in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’ 
(2005) 21 Pacific Economic Bulletin 46; Michel Bertignac, 
John Hampton and Anthony Hand, ‘Maximising Resource 
Rent from the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries’ 
(2000) 15 Marine Resource Economics 15. 
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and maximise their social and economic benefits in 
harmony with the broader environment.9 
The FFA does not manage the tuna fisheries and has 
no such mandate to do so. Neither does it have any 
authority to enforce decisions of its governing 
council.10 This is an important feature of its 
operation that ensures that each member maintains 
full national decision making power over the 
fisheries within its EEZ. This principle of national 
implementation was central in the establishment of 
the FFA, as its formation caused some concern 
among DWFNs which interpreted the organisation 
as a regional fisheries management organisation and 
therefore should be open to the participation of 
DWFN with an interest in the tuna fisheries.11 Some 
of these DWFN, particularly the United States of 
America (US), did not recognise the sovereign rights 
of coastal states over migratory fisheries,12 or 
recognise the fundamental capacity building purpose 
of the FFA. 
The FFA supports the interests of the Pacific island 
states by facilitating regional cooperation and 
providing technical and policy advice. Concerns 
over the role of the FFA were effectively laid to rest 
in the early 1990s when discussions began13 for the 
                                                     
                                                                                     
9 Forum Fisheries Agency, FFA Strategic Plan 2005-2020 
(2005). Forum Fisheries Agency. <http://www. 
ffa.int/system/files/FFA_Strategic%20Plan.pdf> at 23 
November 2009. 
10 Transform Aqorau, ‘Cooperative Management of Shared Fish 
Stocks in the South Pacific’ (Paper presented to Norway-
FAO expert consultation on the management of shared fish 
stocks, Bergen, Norway, 7-10 October 2002).  
11 John Van Dyke and Susan Heftel, ‘Tuna Management in the 
Pacific: An Analysis of the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency’ (1981) 3 University of Hawaii Law Review 1. 
12 While some DWFNs (most notably the US) historically 
rejected interpretations of LOSC that granted coastal states 
sovereign rights over migratory species within their EEZs, 
the reality at sea moved on. For over 20 years, the status quo 
has reflected the coastal state interpretation and there is no 
indication that fishing states are likely to fish for tuna within 
EEZs without the permission of coastal states. It is now 
widely accepted that LOSC grants coastal states ‘practically 
exclusive powers over regulating access’ to the fisheries 
within their EEZ, including straddling and highly migratory 
fish stocks. See Erik Molenaar, ‘Participation, Allocation and 
Unregulated Fishing: The Practice of Regional Fisheries 
Management Organisations’ (2003) 22 International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 454. 
13 For a history of the FFA’s role in the formation of the 
WCPFC, see Sandra Tarte ‘A Duty to Cooperate: Building a 
Regional Regime for the Conservation and Management of 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific’ in (2002) Ocean Yearbook 261. The oganisational 
structures of the FFA and the secretariat allowed the Pacific 
island states to successfully act as a negotiating bloc against 
the larger DWFNs and thereby ensure that the text of the 
Convention was developed on terms favourable to them. See 
establishment of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).  
The FFA works closely with the Oceanic Fisheries 
Programme (OFP) of its partner agency, the 
Secretariat of the Pacific Community (SPC).14 OFP 
is one of a number of SPC programs that aim to 
build capacity within the Pacific islands region and 
support members with technical assistance. The 
OFP provides fisheries science services to its 
members (primarily relating to tuna) and is also a 
contracted science provider for the Scientific 
Committee of the WCPFC.  
Cooperative approaches to fisheries management 
and domestication 
The FFA has been successful in its work to support 
sub-regional and regional cooperation relating to 
access by foreign fishing fleets into EEZs. In this 
area, the FFA has facilitated the development of a 
number of key regional arrangements.  
The first of these arrangements, and the key driving 
force behind the later cooperative agreements, was 
established in 1982 by a sub-set of the FFA 
membership. The 1982 Nauru Agreement 
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of 
Fisheries of Common Interest (Nauru Agreement, 
1982)15 was negotiated by the equatorial Pacific 
 
Hannah Parris, Andrew Wright and Ian Cartwright, ‘The 
Challenges of Fisheries Governance Post UNFSA: The case 
of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission’ in 
R Quentin Grafton, Ray Hilborn, Dale Squires, Meryl 
Williams and Maree Tait (eds), Handbook of Marine 
Fisheries Conservation and Management (2010). 
14 Secretariat of the Pacific Community, Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community Vision and Mission (2005) 
<http://www.spc.int/corp/index.php?option=com_conte
nt&task=view&id=22&Itemid=73> at 3 December 2008. 
SPC was the first of the regional forums to be established. It 
was founded in 1947 by the colonial powers of the time: 
Australia, New Zealand, Netherlands, France, United 
Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). The 
membership evolved through the period of de-colonisation 
and now includes the independent Pacific island states (Cook 
Islands, Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea 
(PNG), Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and 
Vanuatu) the Pacific island territories (American Samoa, 
French Polynesia, Guam, New Caledonia, Northern Mariana 
Islands, Pitcairn Islands, Tokelau, Wallis and Futuna) and 
Australia, New Zealand, France and the US. The organisation 
is headquartered in Noumea, with regional offices throughout 
the Pacific islands region.  
15 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the 
Management of Fisheries of Common Interest, opened for 
signature 11 February 1982 (entered into force 4 December 
1982) (‘Nauru Agreement’) available at 
<http://www.ffa.int/node/93#attachments> at 10 March 
2009. PNG, FSM, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, 
 3
Regional Pacific Tuna Fisheries Management Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs (2010) Vol 2(1) 
island states – reflecting the relatively richer tuna 
resources that are found within the EEZs of these 
countries. 
The Pacific island Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(PNA) recognised that they were in a weak position 
when negotiating access arrangements individually 
with DWFNs, particularly when DWFNs actively 
sought to manipulate each state against each other in 
negotiations over access fees and conditions.16 In 
response, the states that would become the PNA 
negotiated the Nauru Agreement in order to 
coordinate and harmonise their fisheries 
management and access conditions, thereby placing 
themselves in a stronger strategic position when 
negotiating with DWFNs. The Nauru Agreement 
has the following objectives:  
• coordinate and harmonise management of 
common fish stocks between PNA, without 
derogating any of their sovereign rights (art 1); 
• give priority consideration for licensing PNA 
vessels over foreign vessels (art 2a); 
• establish minimum terms and conditions for 
foreign vessel access (art 2b); and 
• cooperate and coordinate fisheries monitoring, 
control and surveillance (arts 6 and 7).  
The Nauru Agreement became the cornerstone for 
regional cooperation and enabled subsequent 
cooperative agreements to develop increasingly 
harmonised approaches to common fisheries that 
would extend beyond the limited membership of the 
PNA. 
Pacific island cooperation further developed in the 
late 1980s in response to the growing conflict 
between Pacific island states and the USA via the 
latter’s refusal to recognise EEZ rights in the context 
of highly migratory tuna stocks. Negotiations during 
1987 between the Pacific island states and the US 
culminated with the adoption of the Treaty on 
Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the 
United States of America (USMLT).17 The USMLT 
commenced operation in 1988 and has since been 
renewed three times, becoming a major plank of 
                                                                                      
                                                     
Solomon Islands were all original signatories. Tuvalu 
subsequently became a party in 1991. 
16 Michael Lodge, ‘Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access: 
Responsible Fisheries Management Measures in the South 
Pacific Region’ (1992) 16 Marine Policy 277.  
17 Treaty on Fisheries Between the Governments of Certain 
Pacific Island States and the Government of the United States 
of America, opened for signature 2 April 1987 (entered into 
force 15 June 1988) reprinted in 26 ILM 1048.  
Pacific-US relations. The USMLT is a multilateral 
treaty negotiated with all FFA members. It 
comprehensively covers issues such as licence 
numbers, access conditions, access fees and 
reporting obligations. The treaty allows a US fleet of 
distant water fishing vessels to roam freely between 
the EEZs of FFA countries in return for access fees 
and the establishment of a development assistance 
fund. 
Cooperation further developed during the late 1980s 
and early 1990s as Pacific island members of the 
PNA became increasingly concerned at the rapid 
expansion of the purse seine fishery and its potential 
impact on the long term sustainability of the WCPO 
tuna fisheries. In light of these concerns, PNA 
initiated discussions in 1990 to develop 
arrangements that might limit purse seine numbers 
within the PNA sub-region. During these 
discussions, the PNA agreed to introduce interim 
limits on how many purse seine vessels they would 
license to fish in their collective EEZs while 
negotiating a more comprehensive arrangement to 
limit purse seine fishing across all PNA EEZs. In 
1990, PNA agreed to provisionally limit the number 
of purse seine vessel licenses to 164 purse seine 
vessels but by 1993, this limit had increased to its 
final maximum of 205.18 These increases were due 
to pressure from DWFNs to license vessels and 
problems faced by national and regional fisheries 
management institutions in verifying exactly how 
many purse seine vessels were actually licensed 
across all PNA EEZs.19 
In 1993, the Pacific island members of the PNA 
concluded negotiations and signed the legally 
binding Palau Arrangement for the Management of 
the Purse Seine Fishery in the Western and Central 
18 Steve Dunn, Len Rodwell, Glen Joseph, ‘The Palau 
Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific 
Purse Seine Fishery – Management Scheme (Vessel Day 
Scheme)’ (Paper presented at the Sharing the Fish 
Conference, March 2006, Perth Western Australia), available 
at <http://www.fish.wa.gov.au/docs/events/ShareFish/papers/ 
pdf/papers/GlenJoseph.pdf> at 1 March 2010. 
19 See Transform Aqorau and Anthony Bergin, ‘Ocean 
Governance in the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery: The 
Palau Arrangement’ (1997) 21 Marine Policy 173; Michael 
Lodge, ‘The Development of the Palau Arrangement for the 
Management of the Western Pacific Purse Seine Fishery’ 
(1998) 22 Marine Policy 1; Transform Aqorau, ‘Recent 
Developments in Pacific Tuna Fisheries: The Palau 
Arrangement and the Vessel Day Scheme’ (2009) 24 The 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 557. The 
development of the Palau Arrangement caused much concern 
among DWFN and raised significant opposition as they, 
correctly, saw this as the beginning of a gradual re-balancing 
of power of tuna resources between fishing and coastal states.  
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Pacific20 which subsequently entered into force in 
1995. Prior to the establishment of the WCPFC, the 
Palau Arrangement was the only mechanism 
available to control purse seine fishing effort in the 
WCPO. 
The Palau Arrangement aims to protect tuna stocks 
from overfishing and improve the economic benefits 
to Pacific island members of the PNA from access 
fees and fisheries development. It does this 
primarily by limiting the licenses available to fish 
within the PNA EEZs (therefore limiting catches 
and hopefully increasing prices) and enabling 
further cooperation in management of the purse 
seine fisheries between PNA. Given its exclusive 
coastal state membership, the scope of the 
Arrangement was effectively limited to EEZs. 
However, the preamble to the arrangement also 
contains statements that emphasise the special 
interest that coastal states have in tuna in adjacent 
high seas areas.21 
Concurrent to these developments, FFA member 
interests in developing their own fisheries grew 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s and many Pacific 
island states aspired to replace DWFN fleets with 
locally based domestic fleets. In support of these 
aspirations, PNA members established the FSM 
Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access.22 The 
Arrangement further elaborated the Nauru 
Agreement’s objectives of supporting local 
development and promoting PNA vessels over 
DWFN vessels. In this regard, the FSM 
Arrangement provided for lower cost licenses and 
access to the waters of all PNA states for domestic 
and locally based vessels that met specific criteria. 
Taken together, the essence of these arrangements is 
a mutual agreement to coordinate national purse 
seine management policies through a global 
                                                     
                                                     20 The Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Purse 
Seine Fishery in the Western and Central Pacific, opened for 
signature 19 September 1990 (entered into force 1 November 
1995). <http://www.ffa.int/node/91#attachments> at 14 
March 2010. Annex 1 was revised at the Thirteenth Annual 
Meeting of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement, 27-29 April 
1994. 
21 For further discussion see, eg, Vina Ram-Bidesi, ‘Regional 
Arrangements for Management and Development of Tuna in 
the Pacific Islands: The Case Study of Palau Arrangement 
and the Federates States of Micronesia Arrangement’ (Paper 
for the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and 
Trade Conference, Victoria University of Wellington, New 
Zealand, 19-22 August 2002).  
22 Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement, opened for 
signature 30 November 1994 (entered into force 23 
September 1995) (‘FSM Arrangement’) available at 
<http://www.ffa.int/node/30#attachments> at 14 March 2010. 
restriction on the number of purse seine vessels able 
to access the fishing grounds. The objective of this 
approach was to restrict fishing activity, under each 
national fishing management regime, and thereby 
harvests of the key target species of skipjack tuna 
and yellowfin tuna. This was intended to promote 
the sustainability of the tuna resources and increase 
the level of economic returns obtained by the PNA 
and FFA states from their tuna resources. This is 
reflected in the preamble of the Palau Arrangement 
which states:  
Recognising the responsibilities of coastal states and 
fishing states to cooperate with each other in the 
conservation and management of the living marine 
resources…and mindful of the dependence of 
countries of the South Pacific upon the rational 
development and utilization of the living marine 
resources and the continued abundance of these 
resources.23 
Implementation of the agreement remained a 
national responsibility and, if successful, would 
ensure that harvests would be maintained at 
‘sustainable’ levels,24 the total supply of canning 
tuna would be restricted on the world markets, and 
consequently, the price of the tuna, and the value of 
the fishery would increase. It was argued that this 
would benefit Pacific island states through higher 
access fee revenues collected through licensing 
DWFN vessels and other vessels to operate in 
EEZs.25  
The question of allocating vessel limits was resolved 
through honouring the terms of the US Treaty 
(which allowed for 40 vessels) and then allocating 
most of the remaining vessels to existing DWFNs. 
Additional allocations, with favourable terms of 
access, were set aside for fishing for domestic 
vessels under the FSM Arrangement. This was 
intended to encourage domestication of purse seine 
vessels and met with some moderate success.26 
23 Palau Arrangement, above n 20. See also Aqorau, above n 19. 
24 Les Clark, Ray Research. Interviewed by author in Honiara, 
Solomon Islands, 7 April 2006.  
25 Les Clark, Pacific 2020. Background Paper: Fisheries 
(2006). In general, access fees were expressed as a 
percentage of the value of the fish harvested within an EEZ, 
with access fee negotiations focused on determining expected 
levels of catch, expected prices and percentage rates (usually 
around 5-6 per cent).  
26 Hannah Parris, Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, Review of 
the Federated States of Micronesia Arrangement (2007). 
First, it appears that the FSM arrangement has spurred some 
PNA to invest in the harvesting sector. Second, it has 
encouraged foreign direct investment into PNA to obtain 
fishing licenses for all PNA waters. See Havice, above n 6. 
However, for various reasons, the FSM Arrangements seems 
to have had limited success in domesticating vessels from 
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Cooperative approaches to fisheries monitoring, 
control and surveillance 
Immediately after concluding the Nauru Agreement, 
the Pacific island members of the PNA began 
negotiating the first of three implementing 
arrangements that would operationalise the treaty’s 
objectives.27 The First Implementing Arrangement 
to the Nauru Agreement28 was adopted in 
September 1983 and established agreed Harmonised 
Minimum Terms and Conditions for foreign fishing 
vessels (HMTCs). While these conditions were 
originally intended to apply only to PNA, the 
broader FFA endorsed a draft of the conditions 
during their negotiations and began a parallel 
initiative that quickly extended the application of the 
HMTCs to the entire FFA membership. The HMTCs 
harmonised licensing procedures and catch reporting 
and established a regional register of fishing vessels. 
Each Pacific island state is responsible for the 
implementation of these conditions at the national 
level.29 
In April 1990, following a significant increase in the 
number of vessels fishing in PNA waters and a 
desire from some PNA to review the HMTCS, the 
PNA commissioned a legal drafting group to 
prepare a draft second implementing arrangement. 
The Second Implementing Arrangement to the 
Nauru Agreement30 came into effect in January 
1991 and expanded the HMTCs to incorporate 
observer requirements, prohibit transhipments at 
sea, expand monitoring and surveillance, and 
                                                                                      
FA EEZs   
                                                     
DWFN into becoming truly locally based (or domestic) in the 
PNA. The Parris, Barclay and Cartwright review of the FSM 
Arrangement in 2007 found that there was significant 
variation in the amount and quality of benefits gained from 
the FSM Arrangement to PNA and that other factors, not 
related to the FSM Arrangement, were probably just as 
important as the Arrangement in promoting domestication 
and onshore development (i.e. proximity to fishing grounds, 
availability of land, infrastructure and services and domestic 
government policy). 
27 For details of negotiations for the First and Second 
Implementing Arrangement, see Lodge, above n 16; David 
Doulman, ‘Fisheries Cooperation: The Case of the Nauru 
Group’ in David Doulman (ed), Tuna Issues and Perspectives 
in the Pacific Islands Region (1987). 
28 First Implementing Arrangement (1983). Full title: An 
Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting 
Forth Minimum Terms and Conditions of Access to the 
Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Copy available in Appendix 2 
of Lodge, above n 16. 
29 Aqorau, above n 10. 
30 Second Implementing Arrangement (1991). A Second 
Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting 
Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the 
Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Copy available in Appendix 2 
of Lodge, above n 16. 
introduce an annual registration for the regional 
vessel register. Once again, the broader membership 
of the FFA endorsed the PNA’s expanded HMTCs 
and agreed that the conditions should be 
implemented throughout all F 31
Regardless of these new agreements on harmonised 
licensing conditions, Pacific island states still 
suffered from a lack of capacity to patrol and 
monitor their massive EEZs. In response, the Pacific 
island members of the FFA adopted a treaty 
framework in 1993 that enabled FFA member states 
to cooperate in surveillance and enforcement and 
share surveillance assets. 
The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries 
Surveillance and Law Enforcement in the South 
Pacific Region32 is essentially an umbrella 
arrangement that supports the development of 
subsidiary agreements to implement surveillance 
and enforcement cooperation at the bi-lateral or sub-
regional level. Despite some initial interest, FFA 
members were slow to finalise subsidiary 
agreements due to the high costs involved in running 
surveillance patrols.33 However, while negotiation 
of subsidiary agreements was slow, FFA members 
began to cooperate more actively in joint 
surveillance operations through Memorandum’s of 
Understanding (MOU).34 
Since 2000, FFA members have shown significantly 
more interest in surveillance and enforcement 
cooperation and have also expressed interest in 
inviting non-FFA states, particularly France and the 
US, to cooperate more actively with FFA members 
in surveillance and enforcement activities. There are 
now four subsidiary agreements in effect,35 a further 
six awaiting government endorsement, and an 
increasing number of regular multilateral fisheries 
surveillance operations that include Niue Treaty 
members and non-members providing support (such 
31 Forum Communique of the Twenty-First South Pacific 
Forum. Port Villa, Vanuatu 31 July-1 August 1990. 
<www.forumsec.org/_resources/article/files/1990%20Comm
unique.pdf> at 19 March 2009. 
32 The Niue Treaty on Co-operation in Fisheries Surveillance 
and Law Enforcement in the South Pacific Region. Reprinted 
in Commonwealth Law Bulletin 702; (1993) 32 ILM (entered 
into force 20 May 1993) (‘Nuie Treaty’). 
33 Transform Aqorau, ‘Illegal Fishing and Fisheries Law 
Enforcement in Small Island Developing States: The Pacific 
Islands Experience’ (2000) 15 The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 31. 
34 Most notably, Palau, FSM and Marshall Islands (which 
subsequently formalised the MOU into a subsidiary 
agreement). 
35 FSM, Palau and Marshall Islands; Australia and PNG; Tonga 
and Tuvalu; Samoa and Cook Islands. 
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as aerial surveillance).36 FFA members are now 
considering the development of a multilateral 
subsidiary agreement and invoking Article XII(5) of 
the Niue Treaty to enable US and France to 
participate. 
Similarly, during the late 1990s, the FFA discussed 
establishing the world’s first centralised satellite 
based vessel monitoring system (VMS). In 1997, the 
entire FFA membership of Pacific island states 
agreed to expand the HMTCs and require all their 
licensed foreign vessels to report continuously to a 
satellite based VMS that would be operated by the 
FFA secretariat and would forward vessel positions 
to national officers to monitor. 
Cooperation between Pacific island states and 
DWFN: The development of the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
The jurisdictional boundaries of the FFA Treaties 
were limited both by the extent of EEZ rights, as set 
out under LOSC, and by the spatial pattern of 
fishing resources, which determined the influence 
that the treaties exerted over the fleets. The reason 
that these Treaties focused on purse seine rather than 
long lining gears was due to the relative dominance 
of fishing activity of the former gear type within 
EEZs. Since the majority of longlining activity took 
place on the high seas areas of the WCPO, the FFA 
states had less power to control this activity and, 
despite efforts, they were never able to replicate an 
equivalent set of Treaties for this gear type.  
The limited coastal state membership of the FFA 
and PNA inevitably limit their effectiveness because 
these organisations did not include other key fishing 
interests that also impacted upon the migratory tuna. 
Until recently, fishing effort targeting the same 
migratory stocks on the high seas and inside the 
neighbouring waters of Indonesia and the 
Philippines was essentially unregulated. In the early 
1990s, FFA members recognised that a broader 
regional forum was required to engage Pacific island 
states with their DWFN partners, Indonesia and 
Philippines and enable management of migratory 
fisheries beyond their EEZs. 
In 1994, the FFA hosted a multilateral high level 
conference of Pacific island states and DWFNs on 
the future management and conservation of 
straddling and highly migratory fisheries within the 
WCPO. This meeting agreed on the need to co-
                                                     
                                                     
36 Operations Bigeye and Island Chief in Micronesia, 
Operations Kurukuru and Tui Moana in Polynesia, and 
Operation Rai Balang between Palau and the Federated States 
of Micronesia.  
operatively and sustainably manage WCPO tuna 
resources across their entire range.37 This was 
followed by six further conferences until 
negotiations concluded in 2000 with the successful 
adoption of the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Convention (hereafter WCPF 
Convention)38 which subsequently entered into 
force in July 2004. The objective of the WCPF 
Convention, as described in Article 2, is to ensure 
the long term conservation and sustainable use of 
WCPO straddling and highly migratory fish stocks 
in accordance with LOSC and the Agreement 
(UNFSA). The WCPF Convention establishes the 
decision making Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission (WCPFC), which meets 
annually, and a secretariat which is headquartered in 
FSM. 
The Pacific island states are a critical membership 
bloc of the WCPFC and were a key driver behind its 
development. Other WCPFC members include 
(among others) Indonesia, the Philippines and the 
existing DWFNs of Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, 
the US and the European Community. The WCPF 
Convention binds these members to implement its 
provisions and WCPFC conservation and 
management measures. Since its establishment in 
2004, the WCPFC has agreed on a number of 
conservation measures that impose specific 
obligations on all members.  
The WCPFC closely follows the framework 
established by the United Nations Fish Stocks 
Agreement39 and emphasises a precautionary and 
ecosystem-based approach to fisheries management. 
The WCPF Convention applies to all waters of the 
WCPO, including both high seas and EEZs. 
However, the WCPFC Convention states in Article 4 
that nothing in the Convention shall prejudice the 
rights, jurisdiction and duties of states under LOSC 
and UNFSA, and that the WCPFC shall be 
interpreted and applied in the context of, and in a 
manner consistent with, LOSC and UNFSA. This is a 
critical point for Pacific island states which saw this 
clause as recognising and protecting their sovereign 
rights over much of the fishery within their EEZs. 
37 Tarte, above n 13.  
38 WCPFC, above n 3. 
39 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks, opened for signature 4 August 1995 (entered into 
force 11 December 2001) <http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ 
convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.ht
m> at 5 April 2005. 
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A critical challenge for the WCPFC will be its 
development of co-operative management across the 
high seas/EEZ nexus, and directly or indirectly, the 
allocation of rights to the tuna resource. There are 
key disagreements between DWFN and Pacific 
island states over how the Convention should be 
interpreted regarding implementation of 
management measures in EEZs and on the issue of 
allocation.40 Both groups regularly cite articles of 
the WCPF Convention and UNFSA in support of 
their arguments.  
Pacific island states note that management measures 
already exist within their EEZs and argue that the 
main purpose for the WCPFC is to regulate the high 
seas and ensure that stocks are not over-fished in 
these areas.41 This argument is supported by 
provisions within both the WCPFC and the UNFSA 
which require measures to be compatible across the 
high seas and the relevant EEZs, taking into account 
existing measures already in practice. 
DWFNs argue that the WCPFC, as the primary 
management authority for tuna across the region, 
should establish management and conservation 
measures across the entire range of the stocks, both 
inside EEZs and on the high seas.42 These states 
refer to Article 10 of the WCPFC which provides 
that the Commission can determine the quantity of 
catches, levels of effort, limitations on fishing 
capacity and other necessary management measures 
throughout the convention area. 
Pacific island states argue in return that the 
Commission can establish ‘global’ catch, effort 
and/or capacity limits across the entire Convention 
area, but that it is the sovereign right of coastal 
states to determine catches within their EEZs. This 
is supported by the ‘without prejudice to the 
sovereign rights of coastal States’ clause in Article 
10 of the WCPF Convention regarding the 
                                                     
                                                     
40 Parris et al, above n 13; Hannah Parris and Alex Lee, 
‘Allocation Models in the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission and implications for Pacific Island 
States’ in Quentin Hanich and Martin Tsamenyi (eds), Legal 
and Policy Regimes in the Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries (2009); Adam Langley, Andrew, Wright, Glenn 
Hurry, John Hampton, Transform Aqorau and Len Rodwell, 
‘Slow Steps Towards Management of the World’s Largest 
Tuna Fishery’ (2009) 33 Marine Policy 271. 
41 Vina Ram-Bidesi and Martin Tsamenyi, ‘Implications of the 
Tuna Management Regime for Domestic Industry 
Development in the Pacific SIDS States’ (2004) 28 Marine 
Policy 383. 
42 Laurence Cordonnery, ‘A Note on the 2000 Convention for 
the Conservation and Management of Tuna in the Western 
and Central Pacific Ocean’ (2002) 33 Ocean Development 
and International Law 1. 
Commission’s functions. Resolving these conflicts 
will be critical to the effective functioning of the 
WCPFC and its ability to agree upon, and 
implement effective conservation and management 
measures across the range of the stocks.43  
The case for change from a Pacific island 
perspective: The development of the Vessel Day 
Scheme 
What was the case for change? 
While much has been achieved by the Pacific 
islands region since the establishment of the FFA, 
conservation issues have generally taken secondary 
priority after development objectives. This was 
reflected in both the structure and operation of the 
FFA purse seine treaties and the decisions taken by 
participating countries over time.  
A key weakness of the Pacific island region’s 
fishing vessel cap was that it did not account for 
effort creep.44 While the fishing vessel cap of 205 
remained stable, it became increasingly apparent 
that it was ineffective at promoting both 
conservation and development interests. The vessel 
cap made it difficult for new fleets to enter the 
fishery that were more advantageous to PNA 
interests. A more effective mechanism was required 
that would enable better implementation of 
conservation goals and support the short and long 
term development interests of PNA members.45 Key 
problems included the following issues:  
1. The vessl limit was too high and there was a 
reluctance to adjust levels over time in light 
of new information and opportunities as the 
US fleet declined over time. In some years 
the number of active vessels operating in the 
region was below the notional 205 limit, 
possibly indicating that this limit was higher 
than what the fishery could profitability 
support. 
2. Deliberate encouragement by the parties to 
the FSMA to increase vessels under the 
FSMA. It is noted that since this data was 
43 Parris et al, above n 13. 
44 Effort creep can occur, for example, when fishing vessels 
adopt better technology that allows them to catch ever more 
fish. If effort is counted only in terms of number of vessels 
the same amount of effort can catch more fish.  
45 Len Rodwell, ‘FFA Initiatives related to the Palau 
Arrangement, Purse Seine Management and the Management 
of Bigeye Fishing Mortality in the WCPO WP FTWG-6’ 
(Paper presented to the 17th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee on Tuna and Billfish SCTB17. Majuro, Marshall 
Islands 8-18 August 2004). 
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collected the US fleet increased in size, 
although the exact extent is unknown. 
3. Reluctance by PNA members to adopt 
further restrictions on the activities of 
fishing fleets in order to account for effort 
creep (e.g. restrictions in fish aggregation 
device (FAD) use or vessel size). 
Examination of data suggests that the 
FSMA vessels, in particular, were the 
source of most effort creep in terms of 
increasing vessel size and increased use of 
FADs.46  
4. An implicit allocation of vessel access rights 
to distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) 
and consequential difficulties in 
accommodating new fleets who would pay 
access fees on terms more favourable to the 
PNA. 
5. Insistence that access fees be negotiated 
separately with DWFN. This resulted in a 
continuing downward pressure on access fee 
charges and a incentive to ensure that 
domestic management regimes actively 
encouraged vessels to enter their zones 
(through generous in-kind assistance, and/or 
by ensuring that domestic regulation did not 
extend significantly beyond the regional 
agreements). 
The development of the Vessel Day Scheme 
In 2007, the PNA states agreed to convert the 
structure of the Palau Arrangement from a vessel 
based scheme to one where the total number of 
fishing days permitted in the fishery were capped 
within a Total Allowable Effort (TAE) designated in 
‘fishing days’. Known as the ‘Vessel Day Scheme’ 
(VDS),47 the objective was to re-allocate the quasi-
property rights away from the ‘right to operate a 
vessel’, which primarily lay with the existing 
DWFNs, to the PNA coastal states themselves. The 
VDS became operational on 1 December 2007. It 
would increase the bargaining power of PNA states 
vis-à-vis bilateral access arrangements, as well as 
allowing other interested DWFN fleets to participate 
(and therefore expand the demand, and consequently 
                                                     
                                                     
46 Hannah Parris, Governing Complex Commons: Essays in 
Regional Tuna Management in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (Doctoral Thesis, The Australian National 
University, 2009). 
47 Forum Fisheries Agency, Information Sheet 07/01: Vessel 
Day Scheme (VDS) Implementation (Parties to the Nauru 
Agreement) (2007) available at <www.ffa.int/ 
system/files/VDS+information+Sheet+07_01.pdf> at 4 
March 2008. 
value, for bilateral access). Within the VDS, the 
total allowable effort (TAE) target would act as the 
tool for determining ‘limits consistent with resource 
sustainability’ while allocation between PNA states 
was based on the unusual formula that combined 
estimates of shares in biomass within PNA EEZs 
with actual fishing history.  
The VDS enabled PNA to account for effort creep 
by differentiating fishing days based on vessel 
length and allowing for vessel formulas to be 
modified over time to account for changes in 
technology and efficiency. A key objective of the 
VDS is to create competition between DWFN 
vessels to purchase fishing days at the maximum 
price. As the VDS has been introduced, allowances 
have been made for vessels that fish under an 
agreement between the USA and the Pacific island 
states (the USMLT) and the FSM Arrangement 
which was allocated a pooled effort target.  
There remains many similarities between the 
original Palau Arrangement and the VDS – most 
notably that individual PNA countries retain their 
bilateral access arrangements while the FSMA and 
the USMLT maintain their ‘bilateral’ character. 
However, the VDS does introduce some innovations 
include allowing days to be ‘traded’ between PNA 
states, and a measure to manage capacity growth by 
adjusting the value of a ‘fishing day’ according to 
the size of the vessel.48 
In 2008, the PNA adopted additional measures49 
which are designed to further curb purse seine effort 
for those vessels operating within their waters. 
These measures include:  
• 100 per cent observer coverage on purse seine 
vessels operating in their EEZs; 
• a three month closure on FAD fishing in the 
third quarter of the year; and 
• closure of high seas pockets.50 
48 For those vessels with less that 50 metres, one ‘fishing day’ 
under the VDS is accounted for as half a day, for vessels with 
length between 50-80 metres, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is 
counted as one full day and for vessels with length over 80 
metres, one VDS ‘fishing day’ is counted as one and a half 
days. Previous rules relating to the negotiation and payment 
of access fees, reporting obligations and rules relating to 
operation of vessels within the fishery grounds remain as they 
were under the previous Palau Arrangement.  
49 A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement 
Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to 
the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA). Honiara. Solomon Islands referred to as the ‘Third 
Implementing Arrangement’. 
50 See Forum Fisheries Agency, PNA Ministers Adopt Tough 
Conservation and Management Measures to Address 
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These measures only apply to foreign vessels 
operating in PNA waters. They do not apply to 
domestic or domestically based vessels. They are 
currently being implemented. 
Operators of fishing vessels may voluntarily accept 
or refuse this new licensing condition. Vessels may 
continue fishing on the high seas if the operator 
wants to, but in so doing they may not fish in PNA 
EEZs. As such, the third implementing arrangement 
does not breach the freedom of the seas that is 
enshrined in Article 87 of LOSC. However, given 
that the PNA EEZs contain the most productive 
fishing grounds, the combination of the third 
implementing arrangement and the VDS is a 
powerful tool for managing fishing effort across the 
entire high seas/EEZ fishing area. Despite 
significant opposition from DWFNs, the PNA 
signed the Third Implementing Arrangement51 in 
Palau in May 2008. 
Benefits of the Vessel Day Scheme 
The development of the VDS arose from the 
growing dissatisfaction over the conservation 
outcomes of the Palau Arrangement, and a sense 
that sufficient economic opportunities were not 
forthcoming from bilateral partners, or from vessels 
under the FSM Arrangement. Like the original Palau 
Arrangement, the full implications of the VDS will 
only become apparent over time. In the interim, the 
structure of the arrangement, and the manner in 
which it is currently being implemented, allows for 
some preliminary comments on its effectiveness at 
addressing the perceived shortcomings of its 
predecessor, and its support for conservation and 
political objectives of the region.  
Political and economic outcomes 
The VDS seeks to advance the political and 
economic postion of the PNA, and the FFA more 
broadly, in a number of areas. The masterstroke of 
the VDS was the reallocation of the implicit 
property rights over the purse seine fishery away 
from existing DWFNs (Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan 
and others) to an explicit allocation of purse seine 
effort to coastal states in line with their rights and 
responsibilities under LOSC. In this way, PNA 
                                                                                      
Overfishing (Press Release Circ08039). For a more in-depth 
discussion of these measures, see Transform Aqorau, above 
n 19. 
51 A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement 
Setting Forth Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to 
the Fisheries Zones of the Parties. Forum Fisheries Agency 
(FFA). Honiara. Solomon Islands referred to as the ‘Third 
Implementing Arrangement’.  
states can and (anecdotally) are increasing their 
economic and political bargaining power with 
respect to obtaining higher access fees, or other 
benefits, from bilateral distant water fishing fleets. 
Allocating resources in this way provides the 
additional boost of allowing PNA countries to look 
beyond traditional DWFNs partners and to broaden 
the potential market for access rights to individual 
EEZs. This, it is anticipated, will increase 
competition (and hence benefits) for access to EEZ 
fishing grounds.  
The income boosting potential of the VDS is 
reinforced by provisions that allow PNA countries 
to purchase ‘Days’ from each other. This has the 
potential of creating additional revenue streams to 
smaller Parties, which traditionally do not attract 
purse seine effort in their EEZ (such as Palau and 
Tuvalu).  
At this early stage of implementation, evidence for 
the success of the VDS is not yet conclusive, 
although it appears that progress is being made in 
several areas. First, it appears that business entities 
from DWFNs (predominately the Philippines, 
Taiwan, and to some extent Japan and China) are 
actively investing in ‘on-shore’ developments in 
PNA countries. This is most notable in PNG and to 
some extent Solomon Islands and the Marshall 
Islands. Operating a canning related facility is more 
expensive and difficult than operating from the 
home country, but the pace of investment appears to 
be growing, fuelled by a general view in the industry 
that without such business relationships, foreign 
industry will, in future, be ‘cut out’ of the Pacific. 
Secondly, in matters of politics and influence, the 
VDS appears to have significantly boosted the 
collective capacity of Pacific island states to resist 
DWFN pressure. For example, in 2006 and 2008, 
key arguments between coastal states and DWFNs 
were partly resolved in practice (although not agreed 
in principle) through the incorporation of the PNA 
VDS and the PNA Third Implementing 
Arrangement into WCPFC conservation and 
management measures. These decisions indirectly 
endorsed the coastal state view of compatibility and 
reinforced the rights of coastal states over 
management of highly migratory fisheries within 
their EEZs. The decisions made conservation and 
management for high seas fisheries compatible with 
existing management practised in EEZs. A key 
example of this was the endorsement of the PNA 
Third Implementing Arrangement’s closure of the 
high seas pockets and its inclusion within the 
WCPFC bigeye and yellowfin conservation and 
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management measure.52 It is highly unlikely that the 
WCPFC would have agreed to close any high seas 
areas without the PNA Third Implementing 
Arrangement decision to link high seas fishing to 
access to the PNA EEZs. 
However, while there was progress on the issue of 
EEZ/high seas compatibility, coastal state/DWFN 
tensions arose in regard to the application of the 
WCPFC to the archipelagic waters of coastal states. 
Specifically, many coastal states, in particular PNG, 
argued strongly that the terms of LOSC, UNFSA 
and the WCPFC Convention itself, limited the 
jurisdiction of the Commission to high seas areas 
and EEZs. Their position was that internal and 
archipelagic waters are to be managed at the 
discretion of the coastal state. By contrast, the USA 
argued against such an interpretation and stated its 
position that the WCPFC applies to archipelagic 
waters, as well as EEZs and high seas.53  
Due to some controversy over the issue, the Chair of 
the WCPFC requested an opinion from the legal 
counsel on, among other things, the application of 
the WCPFC to archipelagic seas. The legal counsel 
referred to the WCPF Convention, LOSC and 
UNFSA and suggested that the WCPF Convention 
only has application to the high seas EEZs, and not 
the internal waters, archipelagic waters and 
territorial seas, due to qualifications in UNFSA and 
the Convention between ‘sovereign rights’ and 
‘sovereignty’.54 Nevertheless, the legal counsel 
noted that in addition to the WCPF Convention, the 
LOSC and UNFSA, other principles of international 
law need to be considered, particularly the principle 
of ‘good neighbourliness’ which requires that states 
must act in good faith and ensure that activities in 
their territories do not cause harm or affect the 
                                                     
                                                     
52 See WCPFC, ‘Conservation and Management Measure 2008-
01’ (CCM 2008-01) a copy can be found at Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission website: Conservation 
and Management Measures and Resolutions Updated on 5 
March 2008, available at <http://www.wcpfc.int> at 30 May 
2008. 
53 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission ‘Fifth 
Regular Meeting: Final Report summarising outcomes of the 
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean’, Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008.  
54 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, ‘Fifth 
Regular Meeting: Draft Report’ (Draft for Circulation) of a 
Paper summarising outcomes of the Commission for the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Fifth 
Regular Meeting, Busan, Korea, 8-12 December 2008.  
interests of other states.55 This issue remains 
unresolved.  
Conservation outcomes 
From a conservation perspective, the VDS 
introduces two important innovations into the Palau 
Arrangement. First, unlike the Palau Arrangement, 
the VDS is explicitly linked to a conservation and 
management objective of restraining effort to 2004 
effort levels. These effort levels are consistent with 
broader regional developments in conservation 
management, primarily through the the WCPFC. 
These effort levels therefore address a weakness of 
the original Palau Arrangement56 which set arbitrary 
vessel limits, based on the ‘status quo’, rather than 
explicitly determining ‘optimal’ levels.  
However, key challenges remain within the design 
and implementation aspects of the VDS with respect 
to conservation. In advice provided by the 
Commission’s scientific advisors, the Commission 
was warned was that effort levels should not 
increase above 2004 levels.57 Rather than follow this 
exactly, the Commission adopted the politically 
expedient interpretation of allowing participating 
states, including the PNA, to select either a baseline 
equivalent to effort levels expended in each zone in 
2004 or an average of effort expended in each zone 
over the period 2001-2004. At the time, this 
approach was largely unproblematic due to the 
55 This principle is perhaps most clearly articulated in Principle 
21 of the Stockholm Declaration. See Declaration of the 
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. 
Stockholm, Sweden, 5 to 16 June 1972, available at 
<http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?
DocumentID=97&ArticleID=1503> at 14 March 2010. 
56 Transform Aqorau, ‘The Federated States of Micronesia 
Arrangement for Regional Fisheries Access’ (1997) 12 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law; Lodge, 
above n 16. 
57 John Hampton, Pierre Kleiber, Adam Langley, Y Takeuchi 
and Ichinokawa, ‘Stock Assessment of Yellowfin tuna in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean WCPFC-SC1’ (Paper 
presented at the Scientific Committee First Regular Session 
Noumea, New Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); John Hampton, 
Pierre Kleiber, Adam Langley, Y Takeuchi and Ichinokawa, 
‘Stock Assessment of Bigeye tuna in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean WCPFC-SC1’ (Paper presented at the 
Scientific Committee First Regular Session Noumea, New 
Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); Adam Langley, John 
Hampton and M Ogura, ‘Stock Assessment of Skipjack tuna 
in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’ (Paper presented at 
the Scientific Committee First Regular Session Noumea, New 
Caledonia, 8-19 August 2005); Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission, ‘Second Regular Meeting: Final 
Report’ (Paper summarising outcomes of the Commission for 
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean Second 
Regular Meeting, Pohnpei, FSM, 12-16 December 2005). 
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uncertainty associated with the advice and the 
necessity of reaching an agreement. However, 
during the ‘implementation’ phase of the VDS (from 
its formal adoption by the WCPFC58 in 2005 and 
implementation on 1 December 2007) it has become 
increasingly apparent that effort creep has continued 
to undermine the conservation objectives of the 
scheme.  
In general, the effort levels, as defined by CMM 
2005-01,59 have since continued to increase above 
the recommended effort levels proposed by the 
scientific advisors. The final VDS allocation is now 
approximately 12 per cent above 2004 levels. 
Furthermore, the increase in fishing effort is 
unevenly spread with PNG, Kiribati and the 
USMLT, accounting for the majority of the change. 
The issue of the absolute TAE has been further 
complicated by the issue of ‘shifting’ baselines. For 
instance it is notable that the 2004 effort level was 
higher than the original baseline agreed to by the 
PNA states which initially set the TAE at the 
average purse seine effort expended in 2000-2002.60 
Although this could be justified on (biological) 
sustainability grounds, as discussed above, it 
nevertheless increases the number of purse seine 
effort days by approximately 30 per cent.61 
Additionally, as with the WCPFC, the VDS does not 
apply to archipelagic waters. This is particularly 
significant in PNG’s archipelagic waters with their 
high purse seine and FAD activity. Managing purse 
seine effort within archipelagic waters remains 
entirely outside any current cooperative frameworks 
and is entirely at the discretion of the archipelagic 
coastal state.  
One of the key barriers to the adoption of tighter 
conservation targets is the disjunction between those 
who are deemed ‘responsible’ for conservation 
measures in the WCPFC and those who may enjoy 
the conservation benefits in the future.62 This is 
                                                     
                                                                                     
58 This was agreed to under Western and Central Pacific 
Fisheries Commission 'Conservation And Management 
Measures For Bigeye And Yellowfin Tuna In The Western 
And Central Pacific Ocean CMM 2005-01' (Adopted at 
Second Regular Session, 12-16 December 2005, Pohnpei, 
Federated States of Micronesia) 
59 Ibid. 
60 Rodwell, above n 45. 
61 Rodwell, above n 45, reports that the original TAE for the 
first three years of operation (i.e. ‘Management Period’) is set 
at 27 386 days, while the PNA recently announced that the 
actual days allocated was 35 738 days (an increase of 30.49 
per cent). 
62 For a fuller discussion see Hannah Parris, ‘Is the Western and 
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Meeting its 
particularly the case for addressing bigeye 
conservation needs where the PNA states, the 
primary beneficiaries of the purse seine fishery, are 
being required to limit the benefits they derive from 
the fishery for the preservation of benefits accruing 
to other, non-PNA, longline states. To further 
complicate matters, bigeye tuna, while not being a 
primary target for them does nevertheless represent 
a valuable addition to their small domestic long line 
fisheries and is an important resource for other FFA 
states. 
The PNA have correctly recognised that addressing 
this issue requires broader cooperation with the 
WCPFC and the Third Implementing Arrangement 
can be interpreted as one response to this situation. 
Despite these efforts, there remains the ongoing 
challenge that the VDS is poorly designed to address 
bigeye conservation. This is because it is focused on 
limiting the effort of purse seine gear, which, in 
turn, is an imprecise mode of control over the matter 
of concern: bigeye tuna catches. 
Its use in this manner is inefficient in the sense that 
catches of valuable skipjack tuna ,that are not under 
biological threat, are unnecessarily affected. For the 
PNA states, this situation is arguably unfair because 
they are bearing a disproportionate amount of costs 
compared with the benefits they gain from bigeye 
conservation. This view underpins the PNA’s 
demand for compensation on this issue. It is clear 
that resolution of this dilemma will require further 
adjustments to the operation of the VDS. One 
option, as discussed by Parris,63 is to extend 
property rights, at least over bigeye tuna, as a 
mechanism for shifting the costs of bigeye 
conservation towards those who may benefit from 
them. 
Capacity management in the VDS 
The potential for substitution effects within the 
purse seine fleets, leading to effort creep within 
participating fleets, is receiving more attention 
within the VDS framework. This is through 
measures that adjust the number of available days 
according to vessel size, and the Third 
Implementing Arrangement which further restricts 
vessel activities for distant water fishing fleets. 
However, if the objective of VDS is to promote 
‘optimal’ capacity for conservation purposes, it 
remains the case that several aspects of the VDS, in 
 
Conservation and Management Objectives?’ (2009) 53 Ocean 
and Coastal Management 10. 
63 Parris, above n 46. 
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particular its integration with the USMLT and 
FSMA Treaties, potentially remain problematic. 
The primary problem is that the VDS, largely for 
historical reasons, has created an actual or proxy 
‘Olympic style’64 fishery for vessels operating under 
the FSMA and the USMLT Treaties. This is 
achieved by the imposition of an actual global limit 
on days available to the FSMA vessels and a 
notional global limit applied to the USMLT vessels. 
These limits are applied specifically to the domestic 
Pacific and the US purse seine fleets operating 
within the WCPO and in effect constitute a 
circumscribed set of quasi-exemptions to the 
broader WCPFC management measures for purse 
seine vessels which are continually striving to 
restrict and reduce total effort.  
This policy environment provides a strong incentive 
for vessels owners who are eligible to operate under 
these treaties to increase their per vessel capacity 
and, where possible, to increase vessel numbers as 
well. For example, the current USMLT restricts the 
number of USA vessels that can be licensed under 
the USMLT to 45 vessels. However, at the turn of 
the century the number of vessels licensed under the 
treaty declined to a low of 11 due to economic 
factors. Since then, vessel numbers have 
dramatically increased for two reasons. First, the US 
removed its restriction on vessel origin and now 
allows foreign built (and significantly cheaper) 
vessels to be licensed under the treaty. Second, the 
imminent implementation of fishing limits by the 
equatorial Pacific island states created an incentive 
for vessels to come under the USMLT umbrella to 
avoid restrictions on fishing effort applied to other 
DWFN vessels.65 
There is also the potential for other sources of 
capacity slippage to become problematic over time. 
The first of these relates to the technical 
infrastructure underpinning the VDS and the 
interplay with the monitoring, control and 
surveillance systems. Critical to the success of the 
VDS is a functional and reliable Vessel Monitoring 
System that is underpinned by rigorous enforcement 
mechanisms. Without these two complementary 
strategies, it is possible that the number of days 
actually fished by vessels will exceed their allocated 
                                                     
                                                     
64 ‘Olympic’ is a commonly used fisheries management term 
that describes unallocated fisheries with a general limit that 
applies indiscriminately. This encourages participants to fish 
as much as they can, as early as they can, to ensure they do 
not miss out before the limit is reached.  
65 Forum Fisheries Agency, ‘Internal Briefing Paper for Parties 
to the Nauru Agreement on issues relating to the USMLT and 
Vessel Day Scheme’ (2008). 
amount, and therefore risk generating gradual 
capacity creep over time. While the monitoring, 
compliance and surveillance frameworks described 
above represent an impressive regional infra-
structure, their success depends on a strong 
enforcement capacity at the national level which 
unfortunately has been an area experiencing 
significant problems in some PNA states.66  
Another potential source of capacity slippage is the 
ability to bring days forward from future year 
allocation. In theory, ‘borrowing’ days from the 
future should not be a significant problem provided 
that the total number borrowed is not large. 
However, to avoid significant capacity over run in 
following years, this strategy requires significant 
political and economic discipline within national 
fisheries administrations in the face of intense 
DWFN (and possibly domestic) pressure to increase 
fishing, particularly on the abundant skipjack tuna 
stocks.  
Conclusion 
The key objective for the Pacific islands states is to 
‘maximise the economic returns’ through a variety 
of strategies to ensure that tuna stocks are managed 
on a sustainable basis in order to underpin future 
economic opportunities associated with the 
resource.67 Taken together, a key achievement of the 
FFA Treaties was that they provided the FFA states, 
and the PNA states in particular, with a politically 
strategic, as well as a practical platform, from which 
to pursue these economic and political interests with 
respect to the tuna resources.  
The advantages of the regional agreements occurred 
simultaneously through several mechanisms. First, 
the concurrent development of a regional 
cooperative MCS regime with operations 
coordinated by the FFA Secretariat was a critical 
enabling tool for states unable to afford their own 
comprehensive MCS regime. These MCS Treaties 
provided members with vital facilities such as 
observers, vessel monitoring services, agreement 
and enforcement on the ban of at-sea trans-
66 See Quentin Hanich, Feleti Teo and Martin Tsamenyi, 
‘Closing the Gaps: Building Capacity in Pacific Fisheries 
Governance and Institutions’ (2008) (Report to Forum 
Fisheries Agency and Australian Government Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry). 
67 Kate Barclay and Ian Cartwright, Capturing Wealth from 
Tuna: Case Studies from the Pacific (2007); Vina Ram-
Bidesi, ‘Domestication of the Tuna Industry in the Pacific 
Islands: An analysis of National and Regional Strategies’ 
(PhD Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2003); Ram-Bidesi 
and Tsamenyi, above n 45. 
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shipment, register of vessels and critical data to 
support enforcement should states wish to do so. 
These activities provided a dual service to the FFA 
members: they provided data for the purposes of 
stock management, but, more critically, provided the 
information sources needed to underpin negotiations 
for access agreements and consequently for 
determining licence fees payable to the FFA 
member governments. As a consequence, a major 
achievement of the Palau Arrangement, and the FFA 
more broadly, was to put in place the legal, 
institutional and technical infrastructure to enable 
states to assert, defend and enjoy the benefits from 
the EEZ rights granted to them under the LOSC.  
The second strategic advantage afforded by the PNA 
treaties centred around the gradual development of 
the PNA states around a unified regional process 
based on perceived common interests in the purse 
seine fishery. Based around the common modus 
operandi of collective management (regular 
meetings, building of interpersonal relationships, 
development of common positions on issues and 
joint decision making) the PNA group, in effect, 
established a recognisable identity within regional 
tuna politics. The value of this was underscored with 
the advent of the WCPFC. Strong cooperative 
mechanisms between the FFA states, particularly the 
PNA states, became a key strategic advantage in 
negotiations with other WCPFC parties over a wide 
range of issues pertaining to the development of the 
WCPFC as well as to matters of policy itself. This 
was exemplified in the adoption by the WCPFC of 
the VDS as an official management measure.  
A less obvious, but equally powerful strategic 
advantage of the purse seine treaties was the subtle 
and gradual influence that they had in re-drawing 
the power relationship between the PNA group, as 
coastal states, and the major DWFNs. The PNA 
treaties, in particular the FSMA, were in part an 
expression of what Schurman68 calls ‘resource 
nationalism’ that arose during the 1990s. By 
encoding and enforcing these nationalistic ideals 
into international treaty, the DWFNs were forced, 
over time, to recognise the legitimacy of these views 
and shift their perspective of FFA states from being 
merely ‘sellers’ of a low value natural resource to 
being ‘partners’ in the future development of the 
industry. 
The recent achievements within the WCPFC, 
particularly the bigeye and yellowfin conservation 
                                                     
                                                     
68 Rachel Schurman, ‘Tuna Dreams: Resource Nationalism and 
Pacific Islands’ Tuna Industry’ (1998) 29 Development and 
Change 107. 
measure, further demonstrate the strength of the 
FFA and PNA sub-group when they negotiate 
collectively. Similiarly, the achievements of the 
FFA and PNA management, control and 
development mechanisms demonstrate the potential 
of this sub-regional grouping to manage fishing 
efforts throughout its area in the direct interests of 
its members, and to extend its influence beyond its 
immediate boundaries. While neither the current 
VDS nor WCPFC conservation and management 
measures yet meet conservation requirements as 
recommended by SPC and the WCPFC Scientific 
Committee, they provide the initial framework due 
almost entirely to the drive of the FFA and PNA. 
Fisheries policy development in the Pacific has 
historically been an iterative process, with new 
developments arising from and building upon 
existing efforts. The VDS now reflects more closely 
the Pacific island aspirations to take a proactive 
approach to develop their own fisheries and progress 
their own aspirations. Importantly, the VDS has 
been developed and adapted to operate within the 
available governance capacities of the region. This 
is an important issue in the Pacific islands where 
governance resources are highly limited.69  
The key success of the VDS is the strength of its 
framework design. Yet achieving its potential 
depends on the resolution of remaining design 
issues, primarily the remaining olympic nature of 
the fishery (that creates significant upwards pressure 
on effort) and successfully finding ways to resolve 
the bigeye tuna problem. It will also need to 
overcome the key challenges with implementation: 
baseline creep, and MCS. As pressures grow, and 
global fishing fleets become more aggressive in 
their hunt for open fishing grounds, resolving these 
challenges and building strong cooperative 
institutions will become increasingly critical to the 
effective management, development and control of 
the Pacific island tuna fisheries. 
 
69 Hanich et al, above n 66. 
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